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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
This appeal arises out of two Orders of the Third
District Court dated July 3, 1989, and August 11, 1989.

Both

Orders granted defendant/Respondent's (hereinafter
"Respondent") two separate Motions for Summary Judgment.

This

Court is vested with jurisdiction to hear and decide this
Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(i) and 78-2-2(4)
(1953, as amended), Rule 4A, Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, and that certain Notice dated October 31, 1989, of the
Office of Clerk, Supreme Court of Utah.

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
These proceedings arise out of a breach of contract
action initiated by plaintiff/appellant Lewis W. Butcher and
Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Company (collectively referred to
herein as "Butcher") against respondent CrossLand Savings, FSB,
formerly known as Western Savings and Loan Company, on March 4,
1987.

The trial court granted Respondent's Motion for Summary

Judgment on August 11, 1988, on the grounds that two of
Butcher's claims were barred by the statute of limitations set
forth at Utah Code Ann § 78-12-23 (1953, as amended).

The

trial court granted Respondent's second Motion for Summary
Judgment on July 3, 1989, on the grounds that all challenged
disbursements were properly authorized.
these rulings on August 3, 1989.

-1-

Appeal was taken from

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Respondent does not dispute the Statement of Issues as
set forth in Butcher's Brief at p.l.

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
. . The [summary] judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
e

Section 78-12-23, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as
amended):
Within six-years:
(2) an action upon any contract,
obligation, or liability founded upon an
instrument in writing, except those
mentioned in Section 78-12-22.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with Appellants' Statement of Facts
as set forth in their Brief dated January 16, 1990, with the
following modifications and additions:
1.

The disbursement dates cited by Appellants are

correct, except that the third disbursement occurred upon
March 4, 1981, rather than March 1, 1981.
2.

On or about December 9, 1980, Appellant Lewis W.

Butcher ("Butcher") signed a written Authorization authorizing
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Respondent to disburse funds from his construction loan
account.

The Authorization provides:
In connection with our loan, as captioned
above, we hereby authorize you to make all
checks necessary as payoffs, direct to the
parties concerned.
3.

All of the disbursements made by defendant were

approved by either Butcher or his designated agent and
contractor, Jerry Willmore.

The contractor's Authorizations

for Payment and Receipts and Lien Releases may be found in the
Record at pp. 78-94.
4.

Respondent maintained a proper Loan Disbursement

Record, which also provides a record of regular inspections
performed at the construction site.

Other than the blanket

Authorization, Respondent received no special instructions
regarding the disbursement of funds.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT I.

The written Authorization executed by

Butcher is clear and unambiguous.

Parol evidence may not be

admitted to vary or alter the plain language of the written
agreement between the parties.
ARGUMENT II.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-406 does not toll

the commencement of the statute of limitations for breach of
contract set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23.

Two of

Appellants* four claims are barred by the statute of
limitations.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE AUTHORIZATION SIGNED BY BUTCHER IS
UNAMBIGUOUS.

The District Court properly determined the
Authorization signed by Butcher was clear and unambiguous.
After review of the Authorization and Butcher's claims, the
court determined that the purpose of the Authorization was
plainly set forth in the four corners of the document.

No

extrinsic evidence should be permitted to contradict or vary
the clear language of the Authorization.
Butcher advances two arguments on appeal.

First, he

contends that the Authorization "amends" the loan agreement
between the parties.

This argument may be dismissed for three

reasons.
Butcher raises this issue for the first time on
appeal.

Nowhere in the record did Butcher present to the trial

court that the Authorization was an "amendment" or "change" to
the other loan documents he executed contemporaneously.

This

Court may not address legal arguments raised for the first time
on appeal.
A second reason for denying this argument is that
there is no evidence to support Butcher's claim that the
Authorization is "an amendatory change to the original contract
terms." (Appellant's Brief at p. 8.)

Butcher admits all of the

documents were signed contemporaneously.

The Authorization in

no way varies or alters the terms of the other loan documents.
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Finally, parol evidence is only admissible in
instances where the amendment is ambiguous or requires
additional evidence to make its meaning clear.

Clear,

unambiguous written additions to a contract do not require
extrinsic interpretive evidence.

For example, in Abrams v.

Financial Service Co., 13 Utah 2d 343, 374 P.2d 309 (1962), the
amendment contradicted terms of the original agreement.

No

such contradiction exists in the instant case.
Butcher's second argument is that the Authorization is
inherently unclear and extrinsic evidence is required to
interpret the "true meaning1* of the document.

The trial

court's failure, according to Butcher, to find there was an
integrated agreement, opens the door to any extrinsic evidence
the parties deem necessary.

This argument contradicts Utah

precedent and common sense.
The decision to permit extrinsic or parol evidence
begins with an examination of the written instrument.

"[I]n

delivering the intent of a contract the language of the
instrument itself should first be looked to, and unless there
is some ambiguity or uncertainty, there is no justification for
attempting to vary it by extrinsic or parol evidence."
Williams v. First Colony Life Insurance Company, 593 P.2d 534,
536 (Utah 1979).

The language of the Authorization at issue in

the instant case is in no way unclear or ambiguous.
Butcher claims that, despite the plan language of the
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Authorization, he was to "retain control over all disbursements
requested by the contractor."

(R. 102.)

This Court's

acquiescence to Butcher's contention that he was to retain
control over all disbursements would render the Authorization
meaningless.

If, as Butcher claims, the agreement required his

authorization for each individual disbursement, there would
have been no reason for the execution of the Authorization.
This common sense interpretation of the Authorization
is supported by Butcher's own actions.

There were a number of

disbursements made pursuant to this Authorization (R. 79-94).
Butcher does not claim that all of the disbursements were
violative of his agreement with the bank.

Instead, Butcher

seeks to selectively interpret the Authorization, in the face
of its written terms, to suit his own ends.
Contrary to Butcher's assertions, a court need not
always find that a contract is integrated to exclude parol
evidence.

The Utah Supreme Court holds that only "in some

cases, it will be necessary for a trial judge to rule on the
issue of integration as a preliminary or foundational matter."
Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Construction, 731 P.2d
483, 487 (Utah 1986)(emphasis added).

Where an instrument is

clear on its face, the determination of integration need not be
made.

Williams v. First Colony Life Insurance Company, 593

P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979).
Further, Butcher's assertions regarding the
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Authorization and interpretation are inadmissible in any
event.

Butcher seeks to persuade the Court that Respondent was

not authorized to disburse funds without his consent.

Evidence

which would contradict or vary the language of the
Authorization is inadmissible.
In Rice, Melby Enterprises, Inc. v. Salt Lake County,
646 P.2d 696 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court determined
that parol evidence may not be used to vary the terms of an
agreement clear in its facts.

It held:

In the instant case, plaintiff is attempting
to prove that the original contract
contemplated conditions not specified in the
writing which clearly would change its
meaning. Parol evidence may therefore not
be admitted to show that the defendant
"promised" to do anything other than as is
stated on the face of the agreement.
Id. at 698.
Similarly, Butcher seeks to contract the clear terms of the
Authorization through parol evidence.
The trial court correctly found there was no genuine
issue of material fact in this case.
executing the Authorization.
is clear and unambiguous.

Butcher admits to

The language of the Authorization

The trial court's decision should be

affirmed.

II.

BUTCHER'S CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FOR TWO DISBURSEMENTS
ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

All parties agree the statute of limitations found at

-7-

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (1953) governs this dispute.

That

statute provides in part:
Within six years:
(2) An action upon any contract,
obligation, or liability founded upon an
instrument in writing, except those
mentioned in Section 78-12-22.
All parties also agree that the statute of limitation period
commences to run when a breach of a contract occurs.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 11.)

Butcher claims, however, that this

universal standard is suspended in any dispute between a bank
and its depositors.

Again, Butcher's argument lacks authority

and common sense.
The general rule, undisputed by Butcher, is that "a
cause of action as right of action arises the moment an action
may be maintained to enforce it, and the statute of limitations
is then set in motion."

O'Hair v. Kounalis, 23 Utah 2d 355,

463 P.2d 799, 800 (1970), citing Last Chance Ranch Co. v.
Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 493, 25 P.2d 952 (1933).

In a breach of

contract case, the statute of limitations ordinarily begins to
run when the breach occurs.

Frederickson v. Knight Law

Corporation, 667 P.2d 34, 36 (Utah 1983), citing M. H. Walker
Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P. 988
(1922).
Butcher asserts four instances of breach.

As the

statute of limitations runs from the date of each asserted
breach, his right to recover expired on February 12, 1987, and
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February 19, 1987, for the allegedly wrongful February 12, 1981
and February 19, 1981, disbursements.
The novel theory forwarded by Butcher has no precedent
in any court.

Butcher asserts that the provisions of Utah Code

Ann. § 70A-4-406 tolls the commencement of the limitations
period established by § 78-12-23 for up to one year.

Section

70A-4-406 provides:
(1) When a bank sends to its customer a
statement of account accompanied by items
paid in good faith in support of the debit
entries or holds the statement and items
pursuant to a request or instructions of its
customer or otherwise in a reasonable manner
makes the statement and items available to
the customer, the customer must exercise
reasonable care and promptness to examine
the statement and items to discover his
unauthorized signature or any alteration on
an item and must notify the bank promptly
after the discovery thereof.
(4) Without regard to care or lack of care
of either the customer or the bank a
customer who does not within one year from
the time the statement and item are made
available to the customer discover and
report his unauthorized signature or any
alteration on the face or back of an item or
does not within three years from that time
discover and report any unauthorized
indorsement is precluded from asserting
against the bank such unauthorized signature
or indorsement or such alteration.
This attempt to join the two statutes into a seven year statute
of limitations period is without legal basis and completely
unsupported by the facts of this case.
A simple review of § 70A-4-406 reflects that it
applies to a bank customer's unauthorized signature or

-9-

alteration of an item charged to his account.
gravamen of plaintiff's Complaint.

That is not the

Instead, Butcher has

alleged the bank violated a contractual obligation arising out
of certain loan payments to third parties.

The tortured legal

argument forward by Butcher is not even supported by his own
pleadings.
The threshold requirement of § 70A-4-406 is not even
met.

Here, there is no alteration to an "item" which triggers

the protections and time periods of § 70A-4-406.

All of the

authorities cited by Butcher construing § 70A-4-406 involve
forged instruments, not alleged breaches of contract, and are
therefore inapplicable to this case.
Butcher claims that the Utah decision of State ex rel.
Baker v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 668 P.2d 503 (Utah 1983),
supports his curious marriage of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 and
§ 70A-4-406.

The Utah Supreme Court in Baker, however,

reviewed the commencement of the limitations period for claims
under Utah's Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-44-1, e_t seq.

In Baker, the court found

that the statutory limitations period began to run when a debt
is due and payable.

The Baker case did not in any way address

breach of contract actions, when the commencement date arises
at the time of breach.

Further, Baker did not permit the

"tacking" of two limitations periods as Butcher contends.
There is simply no substantive rule of law which
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supports Butcher's claims-

The rules governing a bank's

relations with its depositors and notification requirements do
not encompass breach of contract actions posited by depositors.
Finally, Butcher's own pleadings fail to support his
curious theory.

The Complaint clearly sets forth a breach of

contract claim, not a failure to pay a debt claim.

The alleged

wrongful act arose out of a putative breach of the loan
documents (specifically the Authorization) not any alleged
depositor-bank relationship.
CONCLUSION
Butcher provided the Respondent with a specific,
written Authorization to perform certain acts.

Respondent

performed those acts in accord with the Authorization.

Now,

almost ten years after the execution of the Authorization,
Butcher is attempting to contradict its specific terms with
parol evidence.

The clear and unambiguous terms of the

Authorization bar Butcher's tardy attempts.
Further, Butcher's attempt to re-cast his pleadings
into a new theory are futile.

Butcher filed his breach of

contract action too late to recover on two of his alleged
claims.

There is no precedent, in Utah or elsewhere, for

Butcher's claim that Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-406 extends the
time for a filing of a breach of contract.
The District Court's decisions in both instances were
correct.

This Court should affirm those decisions.
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